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EDUCATION LAW
D. Patrick Lacy, Jr. *
Kathleen S. Mehfoud **
This article presents a survey of the significant developments
in the area of K-12 education law in Virginia from 2012 to the
present. After two of the most active legislative and judicial ses-
sions for education policy in recent years, this review can present
only a select number of the many education-related statutes and
judicial decisions introduced during this time. This survey places
a special emphasis on the Virginia General Assembly's recent leg-
islative updates to the Virginia education code. The volume and
significance of these updates reflects Governor Robert McDon-
nell's commitment in 2013 to pursuing a bold education agenda.
As Congress begins to seriously consider the reauthorization of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, however,
the education community may need to prepare for additional sig-
nificant changes to the K-12 school law landscape.
I. CASE DECISIONS
A. Affirmative Action
In June 2013, the Supreme Court issued its latest decision re-
garding affirmative action in higher education admissions pro-
grams in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.! In a
7-1 decision,' the Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's
* Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1969, University of Richmond
School of Law; A.B., 1966, Belmont Abbey College.
** Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1978, University of Richmond
School of Law; M.C., 1974, University of Richmond; B.S., 1970, Mary Washington College.
1. 570 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
2. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2414. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor. Id. at
, 133 S. Ct. at 2414. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed concurring opinions. Id. at _,
133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., con-
103
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
judgment upholding a race-based admissions program at the
University of Texas at Austin ("UT Austin").' The Court held that
although the Fifth Circuit properly deferred to UT Austin's con-
clusion that a diverse student body would serve UT Austin's edu-
cational goals, the circuit court ultimately erred by not perform-
ing a "searching examination" of UT Austin's admissions program
under the strict scrutiny standard.' The Court remanded the case
to the Fifth Circuit for a strict scrutiny analysis.' The admissions
program at issue, adopted in 2004, was created out of a concern
that the student body at UT Austin lacked a "critical mass" of
minority students.! In order to ensure that the student body was
sufficiently diverse, UT Austin began giving "explicit considera-
tion" to race in its admissions decisions.! Abigail Fisher, a Cauca-
sian high school graduate, was denied admission to the Universi-
ty in 2008 despite being a Texas native and in the top twelve
percent of her high school graduating class.' Fisher challenged
UT Austin's admissions program under the Equal Protection
Clause.! The Fifth Circuit upheld UT Austin's race-based admis-
sions program after deferring to UT Austin's "good faith" assur-
ances that race is only a factor in the University's admissions de-
cisions.'o
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that the Fifth
Circuit's reliance on UT Austin's "good faith" assurances was not
curring); Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2432 (Gins-
berg, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan did not take part in this decision. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct.
at 2422 (taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
3. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2422; see generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631
F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
4. Fisher, 570 U.S. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20. "Rather than perform this search-
ing examination, however, the Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge only
'whether [the University's] decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made
in good faith."' Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (alteration in original).
5. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
6. Id. at _,133 S. Ct. at 2416.
7. Id. at _,133 S. Ct. at 2416. This explicit consideration involves giving racial mi-
norities an unspecified number of extra points towards their application's "personal
achievement index score" ("PAI"), a score reflecting the strength of a student's non-
academic qualities. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. Once a student is provided a PAI score,
their academic credentials are similarly scored. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. A student is
admitted or denied from the University based on the combination of these two scores. Id.
at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2416-17.
8. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009); Joint
Appendix at 65a, Fisher v. Texas, 570 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
9. Fisher, 570 U.S. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
10. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231-32 (5th Cir. 2011).
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a proper application of the strict scrutiny standard." In cases im-
plicating race-based admissions programs, the strict scrutiny
standard defined in Grutter v. Bollinger must be applied. 2 Under
this standard, a court must ask whether a university's race-based
admissions program is narrowly tailored to achieve the universi-
ty's compelling interest of obtaining educational benefits from a
diverse student body." A university is owed no deference at this
stage of the inquiry, but it instead bears the burden of showing
that there are no workable race-neutral alternatives available to
achieve the university's compelling interest in having a diverse
student body." A showing that race is considered in "good faith" is
insufficient to meet the university's burden." Without deciding
whether UT Austin's program meets this burden, the Supreme
Court remanded this case back to the Fifth Circuit to apply the
strict scrutiny standard."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that Fisher did
not ask the Court to determine whether Grutter, which held that
obtaining the educational benefits from a diverse student body is
a compelling government interest at the higher education level,
should be overturned." In their separate concurring opinions,
both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas suggested that were
Grutter to be challenged directly, they would overturn its hold-
ing. The Justices may get an opportunity to do so next term
when a new affirmative action challenge involving the University
of Michigan will be heard."
Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Fisher on the
ground that the lower courts did, in fact, properly consider
11. Fisher, 570 U.S. at-_, 133 S. Ct. at 2420-21.
12. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326
(2003)).
13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-34 (2003).
14. Fisher, 570 U.S. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
15. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 ("Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive
an impermissible consideration of race.. . . Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to ac-
cept a school's assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way with-
out a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.").
16. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
17. See id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18. See id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at
2422 (Thomas, J. concurring).
19. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
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whether UT Austin's program was narrowly tailored.20 According
to Justice Ginsburg, UT Austin fulfilled its burden under Grutter
by demonstrating that race is only considered as a "'factor of a
factor of a factor of a factor"' in its admissions program and that
"race-neutral initiatives were insufficient to achieve, in appropri-
ate measure, the educational benefits of student-body diversity."2 1
This opinion is unsurprising for Justice Ginsburg who has been a
strong advocate for affirmative action programs throughout her
22tenure on the Court.
B. First Amendment
1. Establishment Clause
The Fourth Circuit recently reconsidered the constitutionality
of religious released time programs in South Carolina public
schools. Such programs allow a public school to excuse students
during the school day to participate in, and sometimes receive
elective credit for, private religious instruction.2 In Moss v. Spar-
tanburg County School District Seven, the court reviewed the
First Amendment implications of a religious released time pro-
gram facilitated by the Spartanburg School District (the "Dis-
trict") in South Carolina, which awarded students two academic
credits for participating in an off-campus Christian education
program during the school day.24 Under the South Carolina Re-
leased Time Credit Act, a school district may award high school
students no more than two elective credits for religious education
taught outside of the school by private instructors." Parents of
two students attending schools in the District challenged the pro-
20. Fisher, 570 U.S. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. Id. (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex.
2009)).
22. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. concur-
ring); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (argu-
ing the need to distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion); Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the
"persistence of racial inequality and a majority's acknowledgment of Congress' authority
to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to counteract discrimination's
lingering effects").
23. See Samuel Ericsson et al., Religious Released Time Education: The Overlooked
Open Door in Public Schools, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY 2 (1996), http://www.clsnet.org/
document.doc?id=131.
24. 683 F.3d 599, 601 (4th Cir. 2012).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-39-112(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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gram as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution.2 ' The parents alleged that after the District
sent promotional materials about the program, they felt the Dis-
trict had engaged in "Christian favoritism" that made non-
Christian families "feel like 'outsiders' in their own communi-
* ,27ties.
The court held that the Spartanburg program did not create an
excessive government entanglement with religion" because the
religious classes were conducted off campus2" by nongovernmental
educators without the use of the public school's staff or funds.o
Additionally, the court noted that students who completed the
Spartanburg Bible School course were awarded academic credit
through an accredited private school with which it had part-
nered." A record of this credit was then sent to Spartanburg High
School in the form of a private school transfer transcript.2 This
arrangement placed the difficult responsibility of evaluating the
religious curriculum and educational value of the Spartanburg
Bible School on the accredited private school." Although Virginia
does not by statute authorize the use of religious released time
programs, such programs are permitted in Virginia public schools
so long as they avoid practices that will excessively entangle the
26. Moss, 683 F.3d at 601.
27. Id. at 607.
28. Id. at 610; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). To satisfy the
requirements of the Establishment Clause, a public entity must show that a policy impli-
cating religion (a) has a secular purpose; (b) has a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (c) does not foster an 'excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."' Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1969)).
29. Moss, 683 F.3d at 609; see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09, 312 (1952)
(upholding a time release program under the First Amendment where no student was
forced to enroll in the program and the program was held off-campus through the use of
private funds); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203,
209, 231 (1948) (holding that it is unconstitutional to allow religious instruction as part of
a religious released time program to occur on school premises); Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d
121, 122 (4th Cir. 1975) (upholding a time release program in Harrisonburg, Virginia un-
der the First Amendment because the program was conducted off-campus and satisfied all
prongs of the Lemon test).
30. Moss, 683 F.3d at 609.
31. Id. at 602-03, 610.
32. Id. at 603, 610.
33. Id. at 610; see also Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (10th Cir. 1981)
(stating that a school cannot utilize a "purely religious test" for determining whether a
course is credit-worthy for a time release program; to consider criteria such as whether a
class is "mainly denominational," creates an excessive entanglement between public
schools and religion).
2013] 107
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
schools with religion." However, unlike the statutory scheme in-
volved in Moss, the Virginia Department of Education has rec-
ommended that schools not award academic credit to students for
religious instruction provided by these programs.
2. Student Speech
In Hardwick v. Heyward, the Fourth Circuit held that school
officials can properly prohibit students from wearing Confederate
flag apparel if the officials can demonstrate that there is a suffi-
cient basis to believe that the apparel will cause a substantial
disruption to the school environment." During the 2002-2003
school year, middle school student Candice Hardwick frequently
wore shirts displaying the Confederate flag to her school in Latta,
South Carolina." As Hardwick progressed through high school,
she was disciplined on numerous occasions for wearing Confeder-
ate flag apparel on the basis that clothing depicting images of the
Confederate flag was in violation of the school's policy against
student dress that causes disruption or is "deemed to be offen-
sive.,,38 Hardwick filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 al-
leging, among other things, that the school's disciplinary actions
violated her First Amendment right to free speech and expres-
sion."
Applying the foundational Tinker student-speech analysis,4 0 the
court held that Latta High School officials did not violate Hard-
wick's First Amendment rights when they censored her Confed-
erate flag apparel because there was sufficient evidence to predict
that the apparel would "materially and substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school."' Latta is a community that
34. See Guidelines Concerning Religious Activity in the Public Schools, VIRGINIA
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 11 (adopted June 22, 1995), available at http://www.doe.vir
ginia.gov/boe/guidance/support/religious.activity.pdf.
35. Id.
36. 711 F.3d 426, 444 (4th Cir. 2013).
37. Id. at 430-31.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 430.
40. For a school official to prohibit student speech, he or she must show that his or her
actions were caused by a reasonable belief that the speech would "'materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school."' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
41. Hardwick, 711 F.3d at 438 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
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struggles with racial tensions as a result of its racially segregated
past.42 Within the high school, this tension has manifested itself
through classroom disruptions and altercations at school dances
and events.43 Outside of the school, this tension motivated two
high school students to set fire to a local African-American
church.44 The Fourth Circuit held that even assuming Hardwick's
shirts never caused an actual disruption in the school, the clear
evidence of racial tensions in Latta and the Latta school commu-
nity provided school officials with sufficient reason to believe that
Hardwick's apparel could cause a disruption to the learning envi-
ronment.
The Fourth Circuit also found Latta's dress code policies to be
sufficiently clear and not unconstitutionally vague.4 ' Even if the
policies were so vague that Hardwick would not have known how
to conform her behavior, the school rectified these ambiguities by
approaching Hardwick on several occasions to personally inform
her that Confederate flag apparel was in violation of the school
dress code.4 ' Finally, the court held that the school had not violat-
ed Hardwick's equal protection rights because the school dress
code policy was enforced on a viewpoint neutral basis.4 ' For ex-
ample, school officials had also disciplined students for wearing
apparel displaying images of Malcolm X.4 ' Although there were
42. Id. at 438.
43. Id. at 432-33.
For instance, in the mid-1980s, a white student and an African-American
student attended the prom together, causing "small groups of whites and
blacks ... to stir up trouble," which included white students wearing Confed-
erate flag apparel and African-American students wearing Malcolm X appar-
el. Less than a decade later in the early 1990s, the Confederate flag again
caused commotion when a student drove through the school parking lot with
a Confederate flag on his truck.
More recent examples that occurred during or after Candice's time at the
middle school and high school demonstrate continued racial tension in Latta
schools. Heyward described an incident involving a Confederate flag that led
to a disruption of a classroom in which the teacher had to calm the class down
in response to the flag. Another incident involving the Confederate flag took
place in 2009, when a student wore a Confederate flag belt buckle, prompting
another student who saw the belt buckle to say, "If you don't take that belt
off, we're going to take it off of you."
Id.
44. Id. at 432.
45. Id. at 440.
46. Id. at 442.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 444.
49. Id.
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some inconsistencies in the enforcement of the dress code, Hard-
wick benefited from these inconsistencies on several occasions
when school officials failed to punish her for her inappropriate
dress."
C. Freedom of Information Act
Under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),
school board meetings are required to be open to the public with
limited exceptions." In Hill v. Fairfax County School Board, the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered the question of whether e-
mail exchanges between school board members prior to a sched-
uled school board meeting can be defined as a meeting under
FOIA." Hill filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the
Fairfax County School Board ("School Board") alleging that the
School Board conducted an unlawful closed meeting in violation
of FOIA when its members exchanged emails discussing the po-
tential closing of an elementary school prior to the public meeting
in which the School Board voted to close the school."
Under FOIA, a "Meeting" is defined as "an informal assem-
blage of (i) as many as three members or (ii) a quorum, if less
than three, of the constituent membership ... of any public
body."54 Applying the principles that it first laid out in 2004 in
Beck v. Shelton," the court upheld the circuit court's determina-
tion that the School Board had not conducted an improper closed
meeting in violation of FOIA." In Beck, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that email exchanges between public officers did not
constitute a meeting under FOIA because the exchanges at issue
did not involve a simultaneous interaction between members,
which the Court found was required by the usage of the word "as-
50. Id.
51. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3700, -3701 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
52. 284 Va. 306, 309, 727 S.E.2d 75, 76 (2012).
53. Id. at 309, 727 S.E.2d at 77.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701.
55. See 267 Va. 482, 489, 593 S.E.2d 195, 198 (2004) (holding that email exchanges
between a mayor and members of the city council did not constitute a meeting under FOIA
because "the e-mail communications did not involve virtually simultaneous interaction.
Rather, the e-mail communications at issue in this case were more like traditional letters
sent by ordinary mail, courier, or facsimile.").
56. Hill, 284 Va. at 314, 727 S.E.2d at 79; see Hill v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 83 Va.
Cir. 172, 173, 176 (2011) (Fairfax County).
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semblage" in the FOIA definition of "meeting."" In Hill, the court
stated that while the use of technology had advanced since Beck
was decided, the principles set forth in Beck were still applica-
ble."
The court in Hill found that the circuit court's findings of fact
that the email exchanges at issue were not sufficiently simulta-
neous to constitute a meeting, that the emails which did involve
back-and-forth exchanges were between only two members at a
time, and that emails sent or copied to more than two members
"conveyed information unilaterally, in the manner of an office
memorandum" were all supported by evidence in the record." The
court further held that the circuit court correctly applied the Beck
standard when it concluded that the email exchanges at issue
lacked the simultaneity required to constitute a meeting under
FOIA.60
D. School Liability
One of the most important school law decisions impacting
school administrators this past year was the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision in Burns v. Gagnon.61 In Burns, the court con-
sidered whether a school principal owed a duty to a student in his
school and whether the principal was entitled to sovereign im-
munity.62 Gagnon, a high school student, was involved in a fight
on school grounds with another student, Newsome.6 Prior to the
altercation, Burns, an assistant principal, was warned by Diaz,
another student, about the possibility of a fight planned to occur
sometime that day.64 Burns told Diaz that he would "'alert [his]
security and we'll make sure this problem gets taken care of."' 65
Burns, however, did not alert security, nor did he take other
measures to prevent the altercation.6 6 The fight took place as
57. 267 Va. at 490-92, 593 S.E.2d at 199-200.
58. 284 Va. at 311-12, 727 S.E.2d at 78.
59. Id. at 313-14, 727 S.E.2d at 79.
60. Id. at 314, 727 S.E.2d at 79.
61. 283 Va. 657, 727 S.E.2d 634 (2012).
62. Id. at 663, 727 S.E.2d at 639.
63. Id. at 664, 727 S.E.2d at 639.
64. Id.
65. Id. (alteration in original).
66. Id.
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planned, and Gagnon sustained serious injuries.67 Gagnon sued
Burns, asserting claims for simple and gross negligence, and he
was awarded $1,250,000 in damages by a Virginia jury."
The court first considered whether Burns owed Gagnon a legal
duty." Gagnon asserted that Burns owed him three types of legal
duties: "(1) an elevated duty of care to protect him from New-
some's conduct; (2) a common-law duty of ordinary care; and (3)
an assumed duty to investigate Diaz' report and notify school se-
curity about the fight."" Considering the first proposed duty, the
court explained that a person does not have a duty to protect an-
other from the conduct of a third party unless a special relation-
ship exists.7 The court declined to expand its special relationship
jurisprudence to the principal-student relationship stating, "we
have repeatedly been hesitant to recognize a special relationship
where a public official is being sued for acts committed in his offi-
cial capacity."72 Thus, Burns did not owe Gagnon an elevated duty
of care by virtue of the relationship between a school principal
and a student.
The court did, however, find that Burns owed a common-law
duty to supervise and care for Gagnon." The court, citing its re-
cent decision in Kellerman v. McDonough, stated "'when a parent
relinquishes the supervision and care of a child to an adult who
agrees to supervise and care for that child, the supervising adult
must discharge that duty with reasonable care."" The court rea-
soned that "[b]y law, Gagnon's parents had to send Gagnon to
school, where it was the responsibility of Burns and other school
officials to supervise and ensure that 'students could ... have an
67. Id.
68. Id. at 664, 667, 727 S.E.2d at 639, 641. Gagnon also sued the aggressor student,
Newsome, and Newsome's sister who encouraged the fight. Id. at 664, 727 S.E.2d at 639.
The jury awarded Gagnon $3,250,000 on his claim against Newsome and $500,000 on his
claim against Newsome's sister. Id. at 667, 727 S.E.2d at 641. Newsome and his sister did
not appeal and the claims against them are not discussed by the court in Burns. Id. at 663
n.1, 727 S.E.2d at 639 n.1.
69. Id. at 668, 727 S.E.2d at 641.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 668-69, 727 S.E.2d at 641-42 (citing Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 311-
12, 421 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992)).
72. Id. at 671, 727 S.E.2d at 643 (citing Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 319, 389
S.E.2d 902, 904-05 (1990)).
73. Id. at 673, 727 S.E.2d at 644.
74. Id. at 671, 727 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478,
487, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (2009)).
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education in an atmosphere conducive to learning, free of disrup-
tion, and threat to person."'" The court explained that while
Burns owed a common-law duty to care for and supervise Gag-
non, "[t]hat does not mean, however, that Burns was an insurer
of Gagnon's safety; instead, like the defendants in Kellermann,
Burns can only be held liable if he failed to 'discharge his. . . du-
ties as a reasonably prudent person would under similar circum-
stances."'76
The court also considered whether Burns assumed a duty to
investigate Diaz's report and take action as a result of the re-
port." The court held that "when the issue is not whether the law
recognizes a duty, but rather whether the defendant by his con-
duct assumed a duty, the existence of that duty is a question for
the fact-finder."" The court, citing the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 324A, stated that Burns could only be liable to Gag-
non under a theory of assumption of duty
if Gagnon proves, first that Burns undertook to investigate Diaz' re-
port and notify school security about the fight, and then either: (1)
that Burns' failure to exercise reasonable care in performing his un-
dertaking increased the risk of the harm; (2) that Burns undertook
to perform a duty owed by Diaz to Gagnon; or (3) that the harm was
a result of Diaz' or Gagnon's reliance upon Burns' undertaking.7 9
Thus, the court concluded that Burns owed Gagnon a common-
law duty of care and that it was a fact question for a jury to de-
termine whether Burns also owed Gagnon an assumed duty.0
The court then turned to the issue of whether Burns was entitled
to sovereign immunity from Gagnon's claims.8' The court rejected
Burns' claim that he was entitled to immunity under Virginia
Code section 8.01-220.1:2(A) because Burns was a principal and
the statute only afforded immunity to teachers. The court found
75. Id. (alteration in original).
76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 487,
684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (2009)).
77. Id. at 672, 727 S.E.2d at 643-44.
78. Id. (citing Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 487, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790
(2009)).
79. Id. at 673, 727 S.E.2d at 644; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
80. Burns, 283 Va. at 673, 727 S.E.2d at 644.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 675, 727 S.E.2d at 645 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1:2(A) (Cum. Supp.
2013)). The court also rejected Burns' argument that he was protected by Virginia Code
section 8.01-220.1:2(B), which provides that "[n]o school employee or school volunteer shall
be liable for any civil damages arising from the prompt good faith reporting of alleged acts
2013]1 113
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that Burns was, however, entitled to common-law immunity from
Gagnon's claims for simple negligence.13 In so finding, the court
applied a four-factor test for determining whether an individual
working for an immune governmental entity is entitled to im-
munity.84 The four factors are: '(1) the nature of the function the
employee performs; (2) the extent of the governmental entity's in-
terest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control
and direction exercised by the governmental entity over the em-
ployee; and (4) whether the alleged wrongful act involved the ex-
ercise of judgment and discretion."' The court explained that
"Burns' response (or lack thereof) to Diaz' report involved the ex-
ercise of judgment and discretion" because Burns had to decide
whether, when, and how to respond to Diaz' report." The court
concluded that "[i]n light of these decisions that Burns had to
make upon receiving Diaz' report, we conclude that his response
(or lack thereof) was not simply a ministerial act; instead, it was
an act involving the exercise of judgment and discretion."" Ac-
cordingly, Burns was entitled to immunity from Gagnon's simple
negligence claims.
Finally, the court explained that the common-law immunity to
which Burns was entitled was not a complete immunity from suit,
"'[r]ather, the degree of negligence which must be shown to im-
pose liability is elevated from simple to gross negligence."" The
Court, therefore, held that the circuit court erred when it refused
to instruct the jury on gross negligence.o The case was remanded
of bullying or crimes against others to the appropriate school official in compliance with
... specified procedures." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2201:2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013). The court
stated that "Burns was not sued because he reported an alleged act of bullying or crime
against another to the appropriate school official; rather he was sued because he failed to
respond to such a report." Burns, 283 Va. at 675, 727 S.E.2d at 645.
83. Burns, 283 Va. at 677, 727 S.E.2d at 646.
84. Id. at 676, 727 S.E.2d at 646 (citing Friday-Spivey v. Collier, 268 Va. 384, 387-88,
601 S.E.2d 591, 593 (2004)). In Virginia, a school board is considered "an arm of the state"
and therefore enjoys the sovereign immunity of the state. See Kellam v. Sch. Bd. of Nor-
folk, 202 Va. 252, 254, 117 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1960).
85. Burns, 283 Va. at 676, 727 S.E.2d at 646 (quoting Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 82,
372 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1988)).
86. Id. at 677, 727 S.E.2d at 646.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 128, 400 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1991)).
90. Id. at 678, 727 S.E.2d at 647.
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for a new trial on Gagnon's gross negligence claim against
Burns."
E. Special Education
Special education statutes and regulations codified under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")92 and Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504")" are ex-
tremely complex and often do not provide administrators and
teachers implementing these requirements with sufficient clarity
or guidance. As a result, special education statutes and regula-
tions are a significant source of litigation.9 4 This year was no ex-
ception in Virginia and the Fourth Circuit. Recent cases dealt
with issues such as evaluating students under the IDEA, private
school tuition reimbursement, and the availability of a free and
appropriate public education ("FAPE") for students in a private
placement. These recent holdings are reviewed in the following
sections.
1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In D.L. v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, the
Fourth Circuit held that under Section 504, a public school divi-
sion has no obligation to provide FAPE to a student who is volun-
tarily enrolled by his parents in a private religious school." The
parents of an eighth-grade student recently diagnosed with
ADHD decided to continue their son's enrollment in a private re-
ligious school rather than transfer the student to a public school."
The Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners informed the
student's parents that Section 504 services would not be provided
unless the student enrolled in one of the division's schools." The
parents challenged the board's decision, arguing that Section
91. Id. at 683, 727 S.E.2d at 649-50.
92. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006 & Supp. 2011); 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2012).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006 & Supp. 2012); 34 C.F.R. pt. 104 (2012).
94. See Gary L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of
Children with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHNS'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 681-82 (2004); see also
Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The "Explosion" in Education Litigation: An Updated
Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1-7 (2011).
95. 706 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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504's requirement that public schools make FAPE available "to
each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient's juris-
diction" meant that a public school division is required to provide
Section 504 services to a student who is enrolled in, and attends,
a private school." The parents also argued that the school divi-
sion's requirement that a student must enroll in the public school
in order to receive Section 504 services violated their constitu-
tional right to make education decisions for their child."
The court held that a school division is not required to provide
Section 504 services to a parentally-placed private school student
if appropriate services are offered and made available to the stu-
dent in a public school setting.o In reaching this decision, the
court discussed the interplay between Section 504 and IDEA:
Under Appellants' interpretation of Section 504, however, school dis-
tricts would have to provide and fully fund services that an eligible
private school student requested under a Section 504 plan. Because
all students who are eligible for services under IDEA are also cov-
ered for those services under Section 504, this scenario would entitle
all IDEA-eligible students in a private school to full services using
Section 504. In other words, Appellants' interpretation of Section 504
would create an individual right to special education and related
services where none exists. This interpretation flies directly in the
face of the limitations that Congress imposed on school districts' ob-
ligations under IDEA by reading an affirmative obligation into Sec-
101
tion 504, an anti-discrimination statute.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the school division satisfied
its obligations under Section 504 by providing the student access
to FAPE in the public school."0' In addition, the court found that
because parents can choose whether to send their children to pri-
vate school, the parents' constitutional rights were not violated by
making public school enrollment a prerequisite to receiving Sec-
tion 504 services.0 3
98. Id. at 259 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
99. Id. at 263.
100. Id. at 262 ("Overall, the administrative guidance, statutory purpose, case law, and
policy considerations compel our holding that D.L. is not entitled to Section 504 services if
he remains enrolled at a private institution.").
101. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 261.
103. Id. at 262-63.
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2. Tuition Reimbursement
An additional challenge for school divisions working with spe-
cial education students in private placements is navigating the
obligations under the IDEA to reimburse parents for the tuition
and expenses of a private placement. In the foundational case of
School Committee of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of
Education of Massachusetts, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that parents who unilaterally place their children
"during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent
of state or local school officials, do so at their own financial
risk."104 Parents will only be reimbursed for the private placement
of their children if a court "determines that a private placement
desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an [in-
dividualized education program ("IEP")] calling for placement in a
public school was inappropriate."'o
In S.H. v. Fairfax County Board of Education, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia reaffirmed that an IEP must be individually tai-
lored, provide some educational benefit in the least restrictive en-
vironment, and be developed by a properly composed IEP team.106
Moreover, the court held that where the parents failed to provide
notice of their intent to place the student in private placement,
equity bars the parents' subsequent request for reimbursement. 10
In S.H., George and Barbara Hopkins, brought suit on behalf of
their daughter under the IDEA for the alleged failure of the Fair-
fax County Public Schools ("FCPS") to provide FAPE.'s The par-
ents argued that they were entitled to receive tuition reimburse-
ment for their daughter's private placement at the Lab School of
Washington ("Lab"), an out-of-district private special education
school, during her fifth through eighth-grade school years (2007-
2011)."o9 The parents contended that they unilaterally placed
their child at Lab because the IEPs proposed by FCPS during this
four year period, recommending a public education placement,
were "inappropriate and not reasonably calculated to confer edu-
104. 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(c)(4) (2012).
105. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
106. 875 F. Supp. 2d 633, 647 (E.D. Va. 2012).
107. Id. at 658.
108. Id. at 639.
109. Id. at 639, 644.
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cational benefits.""o An administrative hearing officer found in
favor of FCPS, and the court upheld the denial of the parents'
claim for reimbursement."
The court disagreed with the parents and held that each IEP
proposed by FCPS during the four year period was sufficient to
provide the student with FAPE in the public school environ-
ment."2 For each year in question, the court found that the IEP
was reasonably calculated to provide the student with some edu-
cational benefit."3 The court reasoned that each IEP was: (1) in-
dividually tailored to the student's needs as they existed at the
time; (2) provided for some educational benefit in the least re-
strictive environment; (3) was completed by the IEP team in a co-
ordinated and collaborative manner; and (4) would benefit the
student academically and non-academically, especially consider-
ing the student's progress under her IEP during her fourth-grade
year.1 4 The court concluded that even if it held that FCPS had
failed to provide the student with FAPE in 2007, the student's
first year at Lab, equitable factors would still bar the parents' re-
quest for reimbursement."' FCPS had no notice of the parents' in-
tent to seek reimbursement for the private placement until over a
year after the final IEP meeting held prior to the student's re-
moval from FCPS."'
In C.C. v. Fairfax County Board of Education, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia further clarified that a parent is not entitled to
reimbursement under the IDEA for unilateral private placements
if the school division's proposed IEP offered FAPE under the
IDEA."7 In C.C., the student was found eligible to receive special
education services under three disability categories: Hearing Im-
pairment, Specific Learning Disability, and Other Health Im-
pairment."' The parent alleged that FCPS failed to provide the
student with FAPE when it presented a draft of an IEP proposing
to place the student in a large public day school and provide the
110. Id. at 639.
111. Id. at 639, 657-58.
112. Id. at 667.
113. Id. at 648, 658, 662, 666.
114. Id. at 648-56, 658-66.
115. Id. at 657.
116. Id. at 658.
117. 879 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (E.D. Va. 2012).
118. Id. at 515.
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student with services in both self-contained and general educa-
tion classes. 9 The parent rejected the proposed IEP and unilat-
erally placed the student in a private school, for which the parent
sought and was denied tuition reimbursement by the school divi-
sion.120 The parent subsequently filed a special education due pro-
cess request under the IDEA.'2' The hearing officer determined
that the IEP proposed by FCPS provided the student with FAPE
because the IEP "provided [C.C.] the support to learn and pro-
gress academically in the least restrictive environment and was
reasonably calculated to provide C.C. with the necessary quan-
tum of educational benefit required by law." 22 The parent ap-
pealed the hearing officer's decision, arguing that the decision
was not "regularly made"' and not based upon proper standards
of law.124
The district court upheld the decision of the hearing officer
denying the parent's request for private school tuition reim-
bursement.'2 5 The court explained that once a hearing officer de-
termines that a school division offered FAPE to a student, the
hearing officer has no obligation to then examine the appropri-
ateness of the plaintiffs unilateral placement.126 In this case, the
hearing officer properly determined, through a consideration of
all the evidence, that the school division had offered the student a
public education that provided educational benefits and "a suffi-
cient degree of educational accommodation in light of [the stu-
119. Id. at 516.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 517 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 518-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). A hearing officer's decision is
regularly made, and thus entitled to deference, if the hearing officer "conducted a proper
hearing, allowing the parents and the School Board to present evidence and make argu-
ments, and ... by all indications resolved the factual questions in the normal way, without
flipping a coin, throwing a dart, or otherwise abdicating his responsibility to decide the
case. The focus of such inquiry is the 'process through which the findings were made."' Id.
at 519 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The parent alleged in her appeal that
the hearing officer's decision was not regularly made because it failed to acknowledge evi-
dence presented by the parent's expert witnesses and evidence presented during the hear-
ing that C.C. had achieved progress in her time in private placement. Id.
124. Id. at 521-25. The parent alleged that the hearing officer: (1) improperly gave def-
erence to FCPS educators who were not familiar with the student; and (2) erred in con-
cluding that the parent was barred from seeking reimbursement because she had prede-
termined her student's private placement. Id.
125. Id. at 525
126. Id. at 524.
2013] 119
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
dent's] disabilities."'27 Accordingly, the court affirmed the hearing
officer's decision to deny the parent's request for reimburse-
ment.128
3. Evaluations
In an unpublished per curiam decision, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the Eastern District of Virginia's holding that, among oth-
er things, a parent's refusal to consent to a reevaluation barred
the parent's subsequent claim under the IDEA that the school di-
vision improperly failed to evaluate the parent's child for Audito-
ry Processing Disorder ("APD").' In Torda v. Fairfax County
School Board, the parent claimed that the Fairfax County School
Board ("FCSB") and Fairfax County Public Schools ("FCPS")
failed to evaluate the student for APD when, according to the
parent, FCSB and FCPS knew or should have known that the
student had auditory processing deficits.130 The student, a child
with Down syndrome, significant cognitive deficits, communica-
tion difficulties, and motor skills problems, was found eligible in
2006 for special education services under the disability category
of "mental retardation.""' At that time, the parent disagreed with
the eligibility determination but did not appeal it.3 2 In 2007, as a
result of concerns raised by the parent, FCPS told the parent that
the student would need to be reevaluated before any changes
could be made to his eligibility determination and offered to con-
duct the evaluations."' The parent refused to consent to the new
evaluations.'
127. Id. at 525.
128. Id. The court also noted that the issue before the court is not which placement,
public or private, would provide the best or even the more helpful or appropriate setting
for the student; it is simply whether the publically available education that the student
has been offered has a sufficient degree of educational accommodation in light of the stu-
dent's disabilities to provide some educational benefit, or whether it is so deficient in that
regard as to entitle the student to an additional expenditure of public funds for a privately
furnished alternative education. Id.
129. Torda v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 517 F. App'x 162, 163 (4th Cir. 2013).
130. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86514, at *24 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2012).
131. Id. at *2-3. This category is now designated "intellectual disability." See id. at *4.
132. Id. at *4-5.
133. Id. at *26.
134. Id. at *6-7.
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The district court held, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 3 that
the parent's IDEA claim that the school division improperly failed
to reevaluate the student for APD was "foreclosed" by her refusal
to consent to the reevaluations."' The district court stated that
the record suggests that [the parent] is now seeking relief from the
failure of FCPS to do something [the parent] prevented FCPS from
doing-conducting a reevaluation of [the student] to determine his
educational needs during the 2007-08 school year. FCSB cannot be
fairly held liable for such a failure, and Plaintiffs are not entitled to
137
compensatory education on this basis.
The parent also claimed that the school division failed to pro-
vide FAPE to the student based on the allegation that FCBS and
FCPS did not accommodate and remediate the student's auditory
processing problems during the 2007-2008 school year.13" The
parent's claim was based in part on a report of an auditory pro-
cessing assessment conducted in 2010 that recommended certain
accommodations.13 ' The district court stated that because the in-
formation and recommendations in the 2010 report were not
available at the time the 2007-2008 IEP was developed, "it would
be unreasonable to hold the school system liable for failing to con-
sider it."'40 Rather, the court explained, "[t]he relevant inquiry is
'whether, at the time [the 2007-2008] IEP was created, it was rea-
sonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational bene-
fits.'" 4 1 The district court found, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
that the student's educational program for the 2007-2008 school
year was "'reasonably calculated to confer some educational bene-
fit' on [the student]"142 as demonstrated by substantial evidence
that the student met or made sufficient progress towards several
of his IEP goals and made some progress towards meeting other
goals.'43 In addition, the district court noted that while the school
division did not have the benefit of the information contained in
the 2010 report, the school division staff actually implemented
135. Torda v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 517 F. App'x 162, 163 (4th Cir. 2013).
136. Torda, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86514, at *26.
137. Id. at *30.
138. Id. at *40.
139. Id. at *48.
140. Id. at *4849.
141. Id. at *49 (alterations in original) (quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 554 F.3d 470, 477
(4th Cir. 2009)).
142. Id. at *44 (quoting M.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 526 (4th
Cir. 2002)); see Torda v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 517 F. App'x 162, 163 (4th Cir. 2013).
143. Torda, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86514, at *45-46.
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many of the strategies and accommodations that were subse-
quently recommended in that report.14
The district court also rejected the parent's argument that the
student's educational program was defective because it failed to
provide for intensive, one-on-one services on a daily basis.14' The
court found that the student did receive individualized instruc-
tion and that there was no indication in 2007-2008 that the stu-
dent had an educational need for one-on-one services.'46 The court
explained that "[the parent's] demands for [the student's] educa-
tional program do not amount to demonstrated educational needs
in [the student] and do not create automatic duties on FCPS to
provide services in any particular manner."4
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CHANGES
A. Federal
In the last two legislative sessions of Congress, K-12 education
policy has received little attention in either the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate. Although No Child Left Behind
("NCLB"),148 the most recent reauthorization of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"), was due for reau-
thorization in 2007, Congress failed again to produce any major
legislative alternatives to take its place.'49 Congress' failure to
reauthorize the NCLB has created serious problems for state gov-
ernments who are unable to fulfill the difficult requirements that
remain in effect under the NCLB."'5 When the NCLB was passed
in 2002, lawmakers set ambitious goals for student achievement,
requiring that 100% of students be classified as "proficient" in
144. Id. at *49-53.
145. Id. at *54.
146. Id. at *54-55.
147. Id. at *55.
148. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
149. Natalie Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance, Accountabil-
ity, Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 64-65 (2013) (citing Sam Dillon, New Challenges for
Obama's Education Agenda in the Fact of a G.O.P.-Led House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010,
at A36).
150. See Regina R. Umpstead & Elizabeth Kirby, Reauthorization Revisited: Framing
the Recommendations for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act's Reauthorization
in Light of No Child Left Behind's Implementation Challenges, 276 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1-2
(2012) (demonstrating the pressures faced by states in complying with current federal ed-
ucation requirements).
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science and math by 2014."' With the reality that no state is pre-
pared to meet this goal by 2014, the Obama administration has
allowed states to opt-out of some NCLB requirements."' The
Obama administration, however, is only willing to waive the re-
quirements of the NCLB if the state agrees to set new goals in
line with the administration's education agenda.' To date, thir-
ty-nine states have received waivers from many of the difficult
requirements of the NCLB. 1 4
In June of 2013, both Republicans and Democrats introduced
legislative proposals for the reauthorization of the ESEA." Alt-
hough all three proposals are united in their recommendation to
eliminate Adequate Yearly Progress ("AYP"),156 they differ starkly
in their visions of the federal government's future role in educa-
tion.' While the Democratic bill, sponsored by Senator Tom
Harkin, requires states to follow a comprehensive list of federal
standards in areas such as teacher evaluations and accountabil-
ity,5 s the two Republican bills call for state-created standards and
accountability measures in deference to the value of having local
control over education.' At this time, it is too early to judge
151. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 117-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(F) (2006)).
152. See ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/
esea-flexibility/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); Patrick Welsh, U.S. School Progress
Reports Defy Common Sense, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
comlnews/opinion/editorials/2004-03-21-welshx.htm.
153. 10 States Freed From Some 'No Child Left Behind' Requirements, CNN (Feb. 10,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/politics/states-education; Motoko Rich, 'No Child'
Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/06/educationlno-child-left-behind-whittled-down-under-obama.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
154. ESEA Flexibility, supra note 152.
155. H.R. 5, 113th Cong. § 102 (2013); S. 1094, 113th Cong. § 1001 (2013); S. 1101,
113th Cong. § 1001 (2013); see Jake Miller, GOP Slams Dems' Education Proposal as Fed-
eral Power Grab, CBS NEWS (June 15, 2013, 8:27 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
250_162-57589469/gop-slams-dems-education-proposal-as-federal-power-grab/.
156. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(B) (2006) ("Each State plan shall demonstrate, based on
academic assessments described in paragraph (3), and in accordance with this paragraph,
what constitutes adequate yearly progress of the State, and of all public elementary
schools, secondary schools, and local educational agencies in the State, toward enabling all
public elementary school and secondary school students to meet the State's student aca-
demic achievement standards, while working toward the goal of narrowing the achieve-
ment gaps in the State, local educational agencies, and schools.").
157. H.R. 5 § 102; S.1094 § 1001; S. 1101 § 1001; see Alyson Klein, Senate Democrats to
Unveil NCLB Reauthorization Bill, EDUC. WEEK (June 4, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://blogs.
edweek.orgledweek/campaign-k-12/2013/06/embargoed~do not-publish.html.
158. S. 1094, 113th Cong. §§ 1001(8), 2101(1), 2141(a)(1).
159. H.R. 5, 113th Cong. §§ 1001(4), 1111(b)(3)(A), 5522(d); S. 1101, 113th Cong. §§ 4,
2013]1 123
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
whether any of these proposals will acquire enough bi-partisan
support to even reach the floor of the House or Senate. 60 The re-
newed interest in the reauthorization of ESEA suggests that
Congress may pass a new education policy package during the
next year.
B. State
The 2013 session of the Virginia General Assembly produced
legislation that creates significant implications for school boards
and educators around the Commonwealth. In his 2013 State of
the Commonwealth address, Governor Robert McDonnell an-
nounced his commitment to pursuing a bold education agenda
and challenged the General Assembly to consider legislation im-
pacting areas such as teacher evaluations and charter school au-
thorizations."' The General Assembly met this challenge by pass-
ing several major education bills.
1. Opportunity Educational Institution
The General Assembly considered several bills during its 2013
session dealing with the state takeover of schools that were expe-
riencing difficulties meeting the Standards of Accreditation
adopted by the Virginia Board of Education.'62 Bills were intro-
duced in both the Virginia House of Delegates and the Senate,
proposing an amendment to the Virginia Constitution authorizing
the state takeover of schools meeting certain conditions.'63 Both
bills failed."' The General Assembly was more successful in en-
1111(a)(1), 1111(b)(3)(A).
160. See Alyson Klein, New ESEA Proposals Introduced In Congress, But Unlikely To
Be Reauthorized in 2013, EDUc. WEEK (June 10, 2013), http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=
21156.
161. Robert McDonnell, Governor of Virginia, 2013 State of the Commonwealth Ad-
dress (Jan. 9, 2013), available at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?
Id=1591.
162. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-131-5 to 20-131-360 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
163. H.J. Res. 693, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013); S.J. Res. 327, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 2013).
164. The Constitution of Virginia provides that before amendments may be placed be-
fore the voters, it must pass two sessions of the General Assembly, one before and one af-
ter the general election of members of the House of Delegates. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1. Be-
cause the next general election of House of Delegates' members is 2013, this proposed
amendment cannot be passed and submitted to the voters until after the 2016 session of
the General Assembly.
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acting legislation creating the Opportunity Educational Institu-
tion ("OEI"),"' a "statewide school division" to be run by the Op-
portunity Educational Institution Board ("OEl Board"), to take
over the supervision of public schools that are denied accredita-
tion or accredited with warning for three consecutive years.'66
This legislation was widely opposed by virtually every statewide
education-related organization on the basis that it allegedly vio-
lates the Virginia Constitution,"' including the provision that re-
quires that the "supervision of schools in each school division
shall be vested in a school board."68
The OEI Board is "established as a policy board in the execu-
tive branch of state government""6 and it is also deemed to be an
"educational institution" pursuant to title 23 of the Code of Vir-
ginia.' The OEl Board will consist of nine members, plus an un-
specified number of ex officio members."' The nine voting mem-
bers include two delegates appointed by the Speaker of the House
of Delegates; two senators appointed by the Senate Committee on
Rules; one non-legislative citizen member experienced with the
turnaround of failing schools; one non-legislative citizen member
who is a former teacher, principal, or superintendent; and three
non-legislative citizen members appointed by the governor and
subject to confirmation by the General Assembly.'72 In addition to
the nine voting members, the Secretary of Education or her de-
signee, the Executive Director of the Institution, and the chair-
man (or designee) of any school board which has had a school
165. House Bill 2096 was defeated in the Senate, but the companion Senate Bill 1324
made it through the House and was signed by the governor. See H.B. 2096, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 2013); S.B. 1324, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013).
166. Perhaps showing some regrets over the passage of the Senate bill, the General
Assembly amended the state budget by adopting a provision dealing with the OEI, which,
among other things, changed the criteria for the state takeover of schools. Under the
budget, only schools that have been denied accreditation for the previous two years are
subject to a takeover. Act of May 3, 2013, ch. 806, item 134, 2013 Va. Acts _. Further,
the budget amendment directed the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, the
state's equivalent to the federal General Accounting Office, "to study options for the re-
structuring of lowest performing schools or districts" and to issue its final report to the
General Assembly by June 30, 2014. Id. at item 31.
167. Coalition Calls on Governor McDonnell to Veto SB 1324, VA. EDUC. ASS'N (Apr. 9,
2013), http://www.veanea.orglassets/document/VetoSB_1324_release.pdf.
168. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-27.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
170. Id. § 23-14 (Cum. Supp. 2013). Interestingly, title 23 deals primarily with institu-
tions of higher education, while Title 22.1 deals primarily with K-12 education.
171. Id. § 22.1-27.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
172. Id.
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taken over by the OEI are nonvoting, ex officio members of the
OEI Board.' The Governor will appoint the Executive Director of
the Institution' 4 and the Superintendent of Public Instruction
must designate two members of the Department of Education
staff to assist the OEI Board."'
The legislation specifies that the initial take-over of schools by
the OEI "shall occur after the 2013-2014 school year,""' although
the OEI Board may require a school to disclose information and
documentation pertaining to its operation in January of the third
year that the school is accredited with warning."' The supervision
of any school that is denied accreditation is automatically trans-
ferred to the OEI Board, while the supervision of any school that
has been accredited with warning for three consecutive years may
be transferred to the OEl Board upon a majority vote of the OEI
Board."' No later than six months prior to the expiration of a
school's fifth year in the OEI, the OEI Board shall decide whether
to retain the school in the OEI or turn it back over to the local
school division. 179
The legislation does not specify how the OEI will improve stu-
dent achievement or achieve full accreditation. Rather, it pro-
vides that the OEI Board "shall supervise and operate schools in
the Opportunity Educational Institution in whatever manner
that it determines to be most likely to achieve full accreditation
for each school in the Institution, including the utilization of
charter schools and college partnership laboratory schools."o Ac-
cordingly, schools under the supervision of the OEI will not nec-
essarily be subject to the same legal and regulatory requirements
as other public schools. At the end of each school year, however,
the OEI Board is required to make a report to the governor and
the General Assembly regarding the status of each school in the
OEI, the nature of its faculty and administration, the size of its
173. Id.
174. Id. § 22.1-27.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
175. Id. § 22.1-27.1(G) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
176. Act of May 3, 2013, ch. 805, 2013 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 23-14 (Cum. Supp. 2013)). This takeover date is immediately after the Joint
Legislative Audit and Review Commission is required to present its final study report to
the General Assembly pursuant to the budget provision.
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-27.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
178. Id. § 22.1-27.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
179. Id. § 22.1-27.2(F) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
180. Id. § 22.1-27.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
126 [Vol. 48:103
EDUCATION LAW
student body, its organizational and management structure, and
the levels of improvement in student academic performance.'
The budget amendments adopted by the General Assembly
during the 2013 General Assembly session allocated $150,000 to
the OEl for fiscal year 2014-far short of the $600,926 the gover-
nor sought.'"' In addition to any funds that might be appropriated
by the General Assembly in future years, each locality that has a
school taken over by the OEl must transfer to the OEl the per
pupil funding for each student in the school "consist[ing] of the to-
tal operational expenditures for the most recent fiscal year avail-
able, as reported by the resident division in the Annual School
Report Financial Section (ASRFIN), divided by actual March 31
Average Daily Membership for the corresponding fiscal year."8 3
Accordingly, the OEl will receive not only the state and federal
per pupil funding for every student enrolled in an OEI-run school,
but it will also receive the local funding which includes the
standards of quality required minimum local funding plus any lo-
cal aspirational funding provided by the local appropriating body.
Another interesting aspect of the OEl legislation is the way it
treats property owned or used by the local school board. The legis-
lation provides that the OEl
shall have the right to use any school building and all facilities and
property otherwise part of the school and recognized as part of the
facilities or assets of the school prior to its placement in the Institu-
tion and shall have access to such additional facilities as are typical-
ly available to the school, its students, and its faculty and staff prior
to its placement in the Institution. 8 4
The legislation further states that "[s]uch use shall be unrestrict-
ed, except that the Institution shall be responsible for and obli-
gated to provide for routine maintenance and repair such that the
facilities and property are maintained in as good an order as
when the right of use was acquired by the Institution," but the
school board or local governing body that owns the facility must
181. Id. § 22.1-27.2(E) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
182. Act of May 3, 2013, ch. 806, item 134, 2013 Va. Acts _; see H. APPROPRIATIONS
COMM. & SEN. FIN. COMM., SUMMARY OF THE GOVERNOR'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
2012-2014 BUDGET 25 (2013), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/131/bud/BudSum/fullre
port.pdf.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-27.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
184. Id. § 22.1-27.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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pay for extensive repairs or capital expenses."' The legislation
does not address how these two provisions are to be enforced. For
example, there is no provision reconciling the use of a local gov-
ernment-owned stadium by multiple groups, including the school,
or how the OEI can force a school board or local governing body to
make extensive repairs or capital improvements that they disa-
gree are necessary or desirable. Finally, neither the school board
nor the governing body can sell property used by the OEl without
the permission of the OEI.*
If the OEl becomes fully operational, it will have a profound
impact on K-12 education in Virginia. The Virginia Board of Ed-
ucation continues to raise the cutoff scores and the rigor of the
standardized tests used as a basis for determining whether a
school will receive full accreditation or whether it will be accred-
ited with warning or denied accreditation."' It is reasonable to
assume that there will always be schools that will come within
the reach of the OEI.
2. The Educator Fairness Act
Another bill that made sweeping changes to the Virginia Edu-
cation Code is the Educator Fairness Act, supported by Governor
McDonnell."' This bill made significant changes to the grievance
procedure applicable to teachers and other school employees. The
most significant of these changes was the elimination of the fact
finding panel, a three member panel composed of one member se-
lected by the Division Superintendent of Schools, one member se-
lected by the grievant, and one member selected by those two
members to serve as chair of the panel.' Under the former law,
185. Id. § 22.1-27.6(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
186. Id. § 22.1-27.6(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
187. See, e.g., Accountability & Virginia Public Schools 2012-2013, VA. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/schooLreportcard/accountability-guide.sht
ml (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); Standards of Accreditation, VA. DEP'T OF EDUc., http://
www.doe/gov/boe/accreditation (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); Standards of Learning (SOL) &
Testing, VA. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www.doe.virginia/gov/testing (last visited Oct. 15,
2013).
188. Press Release, Gov. Robert F. McDonnell, Governor McDonnell's Educator Fair-
ness Act Passes Senate, (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelea
se.cfm?id=1666.
189. See Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 588, 2013 Va. Acts _, - (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-312 (Cum. Supp. 2013)); Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 650, 2013 Va. Acts
_, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-312 (Cum. Supp. 2013)); see also VA.
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the panel would conduct a hearing and make recommendations to
the school board."'o The panel has been replaced by a single, im-
partial hearing officer appointed by the school board, and, under
the new law, the school board determines whether a grievance
will be heard by the hearing officer or directly by the school
board."' This change was intended to provide both the teacher
and the school system a more timely decision, and is estimated to
reduce the time in which grievances are processed.'
Another significant change brought about by the Educator
Fairness Act is provisions relating to the probationary periods
teachers must serve before they acquire continuing contract sta-
tus. Under the old law, teachers who had not acquired continuing
contract status were required to successfully complete a three-
year probationary period before they were eligible to receive a
continuing contract."' School boards were not permitted to extend
the probationary period regardless of the reason." The new law
gives school boards the authority to extend the probationary peri-
od for new teachers from three years up to five years.' It also
changes the probationary period for continuing contract teachers
who transfer from one school division to another.' Under the
previous law, a school board could require those teachers to serve
a one-year probationary status in the new school division."' Un-
der the Educator Fairness Act, the transferring teacher can be
required to serve up to two years of probation before being enti-
tled to a continuing contract in the new school division.' The
CODE ANN. § 22.1-312 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-312 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
191. Id. § 22.1-311 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
192. See Educator Fairness Act Passes Senate, supra note 188.
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011). The Supreme Court of Virginia in-
terpreted the old statute to require that the teacher serve three consecutive years of pro-
bation. See Corns v. Sch. Bd. of Russell Cnty., 249 Va. 343, 350 (1995). Presumably, this
interpretation will apply to the new statute since it merely authorizes the increase of the
probationary period and not the other terms of probation.
194. See Dena Rosenkrantz, Taking a Stand: VEA Preserves Continuing Contract
Rights for Teachers, VA. EDUC. ASS'N (June 2013), http://www.veanea.org/home/2140.htm.
195. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 588, 2013 Va. Acts -, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013)); Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 650, 2013 Va. Acts
-, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
196. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 588, 2013 Va. Acts -, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013)); Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 650, 2013 Va. Acts
-, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
198. Ch. 588, 2013 Va. Acts at _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303(B)
(Cum. Supp. 2013)); Ch. 650, 2013 Va. Acts at _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
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probationary period for assistant principals, principals, and cer-
tain supervisors did not change.199 Under both the old and new
laws, they must serve a three-year probationary period in the
same position in the same school division before becoming eligible
for a continuing contract.2 00
The Educator Fairness Act also requires that teachers and
principals be evaluated regularly, and, for the first time, distin-
guishes between informal and formal evaluations.2 01 Probationary
teachers must be evaluated informally at least once during their
first semester of teaching and formally at least once per year dur-
ing their probationary period.202 Continuing contract teachers
must be evaluated formally at least once every three years, or
more often as deemed necessary by the principal, and informally
each year they are not formally evaluated.203 Any continuing con-
tract teacher who receives an unsatisfactory formal evaluation
and who continues to be employed, must be formally evaluated in
the following year.204 Probationary principals and assistant prin-
cipals must be evaluated each school year.20 5 Continuing contract
principals and assistant principals must be evaluated formally at
least once every three years and informally at least once each
year that they are not formally evaluated.2 06 The legislation also
requires that evaluations of teachers, principals, and superinten-
dents "include student academic progress as a significant compo-
nent and an overall summative rating."207
Another significant change in the law brought about by the
Educator Fairness Act is in the definition of "incompetence" for
§ 22.1-303(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
199. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-294(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011), with id. § 22.1-294(A)
(Cum. Supp. 2013).
200. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-294(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011), with id. (Cum. Supp.
2013). Unlike teachers, principals, assistant principals and supervisors cannot transfer
continuing contract status from one school division to another. See Lee-Warren v. Sch. Bd.
of Cumberland Cnty., 241 Va. 442, 446, 403 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1991).
201. See ch. 588, 2013 Va. Acts at _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-
294 to -95, -303 (Cum. Supp. 2013)); ch. 650, 2013 Va. Acts at _ (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-294 to -95, -303 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
202. Ch. 588, 2013 Va. Acts at - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-303
(Cum. Supp. 2013)); ch. 650, 2013 Va. Acts at - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §
22.1-253.13:5 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-295 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 22.1-294. (Cum. Supp. 2013).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 22.1-253.13:5 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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purposes of dismissal under the grievance procedure. That term
is now defined, among other things, as "one or more unsatisfacto-
ry performance evaluations.""'
3. A-F School Grading Scale
Another bill passed during the 2013 General Assembly session,
over the objections of many education organizations, is the bill
requiring the use of an A-F scale for grading the performance of
individual schools. 2 " For many years prior to the passage of the
grading scale bill, the levels of accreditation were used to denote
the level of proficiency of a school.210 Under the new law, the Vir-
ginia Board of Education must also report individual school per-
formance using the A-F grading system that includes the Board's
Standards of Accreditation, state and federal accountability re-
quirements, and student growth indicators in assigning grades to
individual schools.2 11 "Student growth" means
(i) whether individual students on average fall below, meet, or ex-
ceed an expected amount of growth based on a statewide average or
reference base year on state assessments or additional assessments
approved by the Board; (ii) maintaining a proficient or advanced pro-
ficient performance level on state assessments; or (iii) making signif-
icant improvement within the below basic or basic level of perfor-
mance on reading or mathematics assessments as determined by the
212Board.
The Board is required to develop the student growth indicators,
which are critical to the grading scale.
208. Id. § 22.1-307 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
209. See Act of Mar. 21, 2013, ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts _; Act of Mar. 21, 2013, ch. 692,
2013 Va. Acts -; see also Michael Alison Chandler, Virginia Lawmakers Seek to Simplify
School Ratings with A to F Grades, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2013), http://articles. wash-
ingtonpost.com/2013-02-23/local/37256037 1_letter-grades-school-ratings-b-schools (dis-
cussing how educators and the Virginia Association of School Superintendents criticized
the grade system).
210. Chandler, supra note 209.
211. Ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts at ; ch. 692, 2013 Va. Acts at _. The growth indicators
are also required to be used in teacher evaluations. See Ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts at _; ch.
692, 2013 Va. Acts at .
212. Ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts at _; ch. 692, 2013 Va. Acts at_.
213. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 640, 2013 Va. Acts __ ; ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts at-;
ch. 692, 2013 Va. Acts at -. In an interesting twist, one version of the grading scale bill
that was passed would have required the Board to develop the growth indicators by Octo-
ber 1, 2014, while the other two bills that passed required their development by July 31,
2013. Compare ch. 640, 2013 Va. Acts at -, with ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts at -, and ch.
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4. Kinship Care
Another bill that caused much debate among the K-12 educa-
tion community is a bill that amends section 22.1-3 of the Virgin-
ia Code, which deals with persons who are entitled to attend pub-
lic schools for free.214 Prior to the enactment of this legislation,
there were two schools of thought regarding the right of a student
living in a school division with someone other than his or her le-
gal parent or guardian to attend the public schools in that school
division. This issue is important particularly for school divisions
that experience a high volume of students attempting to enroll
from other school divisions. These students are often in situations
in which it is difficult to determine whether the student's resi-
dency is legitimate. The first school of thought, based on a strict
reading of the statute, was that the list of persons in section 22.1-
3 entitled to attend public schools was exclusive, and, therefore, a
student living in the school division with a relative who did not
have legal custody or guardianship over the child was not entitled
to attend the public schools in that school division. 21 5 The other
school of thought, based on long-standing opinions of the Attorney
General, 216 was that the categories of persons listed in section
22.1-3 are not exclusive, and that any school aged child who is a
bona fide resident of the school division not solely for school pur-
poses is entitled to attend the public schools in that school divi-
sion regardless of the person with whom the student is living.217
The new legislation partially resolves the conflicts between
these two schools of thought by adding to the list of persons enti-
tled to attend the public schools for free children whose parents
are unable to care for them and who are living, not solely for
692, 2013 Va. Acts at _. Because the bills that used the 2013 date were signed after the
bill that used the 2014 date, the 2013 date takes precedence. Compare ch. 640, 2013 Va.
Acts at , with ch. 672, 2013 Va. Acts at , and ch. 692, 2013 Va. Acts at _.
214. Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 779, 2013 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 2013)); Preview of the 2013 Legislative Session, VA. ASS'N
OF SECONDARY SCH. PRINCIPALS, http://www.vassp.org/VASSP/legislativeadvocacy/legis
lative-initiatives/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); Hannah Hess, VA's Kinship Care Bill Could
Open The Door To 'School Shopping,' LEESBURG TODAY (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:17 PM), available
at http://www.leesburgtoday.com/news/general-assembly/va-s-kinship-care-bill-could-open
-the-door-to/article_87f69dc6-63db- 11e l-b880-0019bb2963f4.html.
215. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 2013); see, e.g., 2007 Op. Va. Att'y Gen.
84, 85, 87 (discussing how a school division found the list exhaustive).
216. 2007 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 84, 85; 1987 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 374, 375.
217. 2007 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 84, 85; 1987 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 374, 375.
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school purposes, with a person in the school division who is "an
adult relative providing temporary kinship care as that term is
defined in § 63.2-100."'21 Under the new law, a school division
may require one or both parents and the relative providing kinship
care to submit signed, notarized affidavits (a) explaining why the
parents are unable to care for the person, (b) detailing the kinship
care arrangement, and (c) agreeing that the kinship care provider or
the parent will notify the school within 30 days of when the kinship
219
care arrangement ends.
A school division may also require "a power of attorney authoriz-
ing the adult relative to make educational decisions regarding the
person."220
In addition, a school division may also require the parent or
kinship care provider to procure written verification from the de-
partment of social services "that the kinship arrangement serves
a legitimate purpose that is in the best interest of the person oth-
er than school enrollment."22 ' The school division may require
"continued verification" from the department of social services if
the kinship care arrangement lasts more than one year. 22
Depending upon the school of thought to which the school divi-
sion previously subscribed, these changes may result in an in-
crease or decrease in the number of students eligible to attend the
public schools. The benefit of these changes, however, is that they
will provide school divisions with some certainty regarding the
details and duration of a kinship care arrangement and certainty
that the kinship care provider is authorized by the parent to
make decisions regarding the student-assurances that were
lacking under the prior law.
218. Ch. 779, 2013 Va. Acts at - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-3
(Cum. Supp. 2013)). It is important to note that this legislation included a sunset provi-
sion and therefore, will expire on June 30, 2016. Id.
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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